Institutions and credit by Farla, K.
  
 
Institutions and credit
Citation for published version (APA):
Farla, K. (2012). Institutions and credit. (UNU-MERIT Working Papers; No. 038). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT,
Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2012
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
#2012-038 
               
 
 
 
Institutions and credit 
Kristine Farla 
 
 
       
 
 
 Working Paper Series on Institutions and Economic Growth: IPD WP07 
 
This working  paper  is  part  of  the  research  programme  on  ‘Institutions, Governance  and 
Long‐term  Economic  Growth’,  a  partnership  between  the  French  Development  Agency 
(AFD)  and  the Maastricht Graduate  School  of Governance  (Maastricht University  – UNU‐
Merit). The research builds on the  Institutional Profiles Database  IPD,  jointly developed by 
AFD and the French Ministry of the Economy since 2001.  
 
ISSN 1871‐9872 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) 
email: info@merit.unu.edu | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
email: info‐governance@maastrichtuniversity.nl | website: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu 
 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499 
UNU‐MERIT Working Paper Series 
AFD‐MGSoG/UNU‐Merit Working Paper Series on  
« Institutions, Governance and Long term Growth » 
 
 
In 2010, the French Development Agency (AFD)  initiated a partnership with the Maastricht 
Graduate  School  of  Governance  (Maastricht  University  ‐  UNU‐Merit)  with  a  view  to 
exploring the conceptual and econometric relationships between institutions and long‐term 
growth.  As  a  development  bank  with  a  long‐term  lending  horizon,  AFD  is  particularly 
interested  in  better  understanding  the  determinants  of  countries’  long  term  economic, 
social, and political trajectory.  
 
AFD has thus developed a programme on “Institutions, Governance, and Long‐term Growth” 
dealing with the five following dimensions:  
(i) Measuring institutions and discussing the meaning of such measures, notably 
through the Institutional Profiles Database;  
(ii) Testing the econometric relationship between institutional measures and long 
term growth;  
(iii) Exploring through a series of country case studies the historical relationship 
between processes of economic accumulation, forms of political organisation, 
and social cohesion;  
(iv) Discussing conceptual frameworks for making sense of the interaction between 
political, social and economic forces in the process of development; 
(v) Developing methodologies for political economy analyses.  
 
The MGSoG/UNU‐Merit team  is  involved  in the  five dimensions with a particular  focus on 
the  first  two.  Its primary objective  is  to explore  the  Institutional Profiles Database  jointly 
developed by AFD and the French Ministry of the Economy since 2001. Institutional Profiles 
Database  is  unique  by  its  scope  (about  350  elementary  questions  pertaining  to  all 
institutional  dimensions  covering  148  countries  in  2012),  its  entirely  free  access,  and  its 
ambition  to  incorporate  the  most  recent  theoretical  advances  in  the  field  of  political 
economy.  
 
The present series intends to convey the results of our ongoing research, and in so doing to 
reflect  the  wealth  of  issues  that  can  be  fruitfully  addressed  from  an  “institutionalist” 
perspective. We hope that readers will find these papers stimulating and useful to develop 
their own understanding and research.  
 
Nicolas Meisel (AFD) 
Adam Szirmai (MGSoG/UNU‐Merit) 
 
 
For more information on the programme, please visit our websites:   
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Schools/MGSoG/ProjectPages/InstitutionalProfilesDatabase.htm 
http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/recherche/themes‐recherches/institutions‐gouvernance‐croissance 
Institutions and Credit∗
Kristine Farla†
31/01/2012
Working Paper
Abstract
It is well-known that the extent of credit lent to private agents
differs widely between countries. The ‘financial deepening’ of the
economy offers opportunities as well as financial risks. This study
investigates the extent to which institutional characteristics are re-
lated to countries’ level of credit depth. The findings suggest that the
formalization of property rights, contracting, and competition insti-
tutions is positively related to an increase in the level of credit to the
private sector. This result remains robust when controlling for the
effect of financial policy. The effect of institutional characteristics on
banks’ lending capacity and investment is mixed. However, overall,
institutional formalization has a positive impact on credit deepening
and investment.
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1 Introduction
Credit to the private sector in the Unites States, Japan, Canada, Germany,
and China is higher than 100% of GDP. In countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
credit to the private sector is, on average, lower than 20% of GDP. Why do
these wide differences occur? And are they important? This study focuses
on the effect of institutional characteristics on mediating factors in the re-
lationship between institutions and growth. The financial sector functions
as an important intermediary; its role is the transformation of savings into
profitable investments. Specifically, we are interested in the influence of insti-
tutional characteristics on private sector credit deepening. Credit deepening
is defined as an increase in the volume of credit.
Credit deepening makes possible an increase in investment, an expan-
sion of production, technological change, and economic growth, and attracts
foreign direct investment. Levine (2005, p. 921) summarizes that “empiri-
cal analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual
country-level studies, time-series studies, panel investigations, and broad
cross-country comparisons, demonstrate a strong positive link between the
functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth”. However,
since 2008, it is undeniable that rapid private credit build-up, caused by fi-
nancial system deregulation and privatization, can trigger a crisis big enough
to have negative long-run consequences on growth. As such, there are limi-
tations to the extent to which capital deepening is beneficial to growth. This
has been recognized by previous literature, such as Minsky (1986); Kindle-
berger and Aliber (2005); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Financial development has been studied with focus on different determi-
nants: legal origins (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shliefer, 2008), political
institutions and democracy (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Huang, 2010),
openness (Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law, 2009), and financial reform (Tres-
sel and Detragiache, 2008). The general interest of such studies is to under-
stand how financial development can be stimulated. For example, Tressel
and Detragiache (2008); Quintyn and Verdier (2010); Huang (2010) find that
political institutions are related to short-run financial performance and the
degree of stability of financial accelerations, in particular in lower income
countries. Political institutions describe, for example, the degree of legality
of political representation and political authority. In contrast to political
institutions, we expect that institutional rules have an influence on long-run
financial development. Institutional rules describe, for example, the func-
tioning of the public administration and the strength of the legal system.
Institutional rules are determined within the public sector and shape incen-
tives for the private sector, constrain and generate costs and enforce a social
2
order that maintains a given cost structure.
Institutional rules influence the degree of risk that financial intermedi-
aries, firms, and private investors are willing to take on in their lending
operations. For example, fear of expropriation of firms’ property influences
firms’ willingness to borrow and firms’ borrowing eligibility.1 Also, institu-
tional rules affect the degree of systemic risk. As a result, institutional rules
influence access to credit, the cost of credit, the volume of credit extended,
and the allocative efficiency of credit distribution.
Credit depth is measured using data on domestic credit to the private
sector by financial intermediaries: the total value of loans, trade credits and
non-equity securities, as a ratio to GDP. Credit data is commonly used in
the literature on financial development.2 In comparison to other financing
sources, (e.g. government finance, equity finance, and corporate bond fi-
nance) credit to the private sector is a good proxy for financial development
in low-income countries. Especially in low income countries the financial sys-
tem is bank dominated and the benefits from credit market development are
greater. Firstly, in low income countries savings are relatively smaller than
in high income countries, and savings tend to be invested in liquid forms and
trade credits. Secondly, in low income countries there are relatively few credit
worthy, reputable organizations that are worth investing in making bond and
equity financing a challenge. Thirdly, compared to high income countries,
low income countries have relatively few large firms; smaller firms rely more
on bank financing as a source of formal credit allocation. Fourthly, corpo-
rate bond markets depend on formalized financial markets and institutional
arrangements which, on average, low income countries have not acquired.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) disentangle the effect of property rights
and contracting institutions on economic and financial performance. They
find that property rights protection has a positive influence on GDP per
capita, investment, private credit, and stock market capitalization. However,
contracting is argued to merely have an effect on stock market capitalization.
The results of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) are based on institutional mea-
surements from different sources. We expect that estimates of the effect of
closely related institutional characteristics on economic performance are more
accurate when using the same source for the institutional indicators. Fur-
thermore, lack of cross-country comparability of indicators is a shortcoming
of many institution and/or governance indicators. Often researchers’ inter-
1See Sacerdoti (2005) for a study on firms’ ease of access to financing in developing
countries.
2For example, Huang (2010); Quintyn and Verdier (2010); Baltagi et al. (2009); Djankov
et al. (2007); Safavian and Sharma (2007); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use credit data
in their studies.
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pretation of institutional development has been compromised due to choices
made in the selection of the existing measurements on institutions and gov-
ernance (Arndt, 2009).
We construct indicators for property rights, contracting, and market com-
petition institutions using the same data source. To our knowledge, the
relevance of this combination of institutional characteristics has not been
previously investigated in relation to financial development. The institu-
tional indicators are transparent in their composition, comparable in scale
and construction, and include both de-jure and de-facto perspectives on coun-
tries’ institutional development. The institutional indicators describe insti-
tutional characteristics which are stable and inert in the medium/long-term.
The Hausman-Taylor method with Amemiya-MaCurdy (1986) specification
is used in order to retrieve the parameter estimates of these time-invariant
institutional indicators.
On the basis of panel data of 81 countries for the period 1994-2005, we
conclude that there is a strong causal relationship between property rights,
contracting and competition institutions and the level of credit to the private
sector. The institutional indicators remain positive and significant when con-
trolling for the effect of financial policy, and when using alternative measures
of financial depth and investment.
2 Theory
The idea that institutional rules range from formal to informal has been used
in the works of several authors.3 Greif and Tabellini (2010) argue that, in
China, institutions rely more on an informal organization of enforcement,
but, in Europe, institutions rely more on a formal organization of enforce-
ment.4 Credit markets that function on the basis of informal rule systems are
dependent on close relationships between financial intermediaries and firms.
Loans and trade credits are established on a personalized basis and loan
commitment is a personal matter for the parties involved. Entrepreneurs
and start-ups that have not established relationships may, for this reason,
have different borrowing opportunities than incumbents. In credit markets
that function on the basis of formalized rules, credit is allocated following
formal requirements. The history of today’s high income countries shows
3See North (1994); Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008); de Crombrugghe and Farla (2011),
and Greif and Tabellini (2010).
4Easterly (2008) makes a different, yet similar, distinction to the formal and informal
institutional differences and argues that written laws are top-down institutions, and social
norms, customs, traditions, beliefs, and values of individuals are bottom-up institutions.
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that previous informal social rules and trust based social systems were trans-
formed to formalized rule based societies. This change has lowered costs
of lending, generated a higher lending base, and increased the financing of
more long-term commitments. In the remainder of this section, we propose
explanations for how (1) property rights protection, (2) contracting and (3)
competition institutions influence the level of credit to the private sector.
Firstly, property rights protection has been defined as a key corner stone
in the development of an economic market. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005, p.
955) describe property rights institutions as “rules and regulations protecting
citizens against the power of the government and elites”. Property rights
protection consists of measures protecting current and future tangible and
intangible property and revenues that originate from property, i.e., land and
non-land assets and intellectual property. Property rights protection develops
in societies where elitist groups are interested in protecting their properties.
Formalized property rights institutions secure property ownership over
time. Weak security of property rights can endanger investors’ and borrow-
ers’ ability to retrieve future revenue from investment. This has a negative
impact on firms’ ability to borrow and invest and may lower the size of loans.
Also, firms may concentrate investment in sectors that benefit from a rela-
tively higher level of protection and may under-invest in others.5 Banks need
to secure a high recovery rate and limit the financing of operations with high
risk, especially risk that they can not diversify. Bae and Goyal (2009) find
that banks issue higher loan amounts with longer loan maturities and re-
quest relatively lower loan spreads in countries with strong property rights
protection than in countries with weak property rights protection.
Secondly, the formalization of contracting institutions is likewise argued
to be crucial for financial development (Dixit, 2009). Contracting institu-
tions consist of arrangements protecting the security of contracts, govern-
ment respect for contracts, transparency in the banking system, enforcement
of the justice system, creditor rights, the speed of rulings and effectiveness of
commercial courts. The formalization of contracting institutions reduces in-
formation asymmetry, the costs of contracting, the risk of contractual breach,
and can enhance the credibility of contracting. Equal treatment and trans-
parency in the allocation of public procurement contracts reinforces market
competitiveness. In countries with formalized contracting institutions, when
a contract is terminated, the contracting agent can expect (the enforcement
of) compensation as established in the contract. In societies with infor-
mal contracting institutions private contractual agreements are enforced by
5E.g., the underdevelopment of intellectual property rights causes organizations to
under-invest in intangible assets (Claessens and Laeven, 2003).
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personal relationships. Here, contracting agreements may not protect the
interest of all actors against the interests of powerful elitist groups.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that contracting institutions are not
significantly related to credit market development. They hypothesize that
contracting institutions are relatively unimportant because agents can change
financial intermediation and terms of contracts. Indeed, private sector reg-
ulations can act as a complement or substitute for contracting institutions.
According to Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), private registries can
stimulate the private sector by facilitating information exchange between
firms, which decreases transaction costs.6 Moreover, a transition from low
income to middle income is associated with an increase in firms using banks
to finance investment. Personalized contracting systems may be sufficient
to protect ‘small’ loans. In particular for short-run lending arrangements,
investors and firms may prefer to avoid formal contracting arrangements.
Nevertheless, we argue that substantial credit deepening requires formal con-
tracting institutions.
Thirdly, we expect that market competition institutions are fundamental
to sustain financial market deepening. The objectives of competition regu-
lations are to “control or eliminate restrictive agreements or arrangements
among enterprises, or mergers and acquisitions or abuse of dominant posi-
tions of market power, which limit access to markets or otherwise unduly
restrain competition, adversely affecting domestic or international trade or
economic development” (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 3).7 The absence of competition
institutions may create an environment that only supports the development
of the existing industry. Powerful organizations may block competition and
may become powerful beyond state control. The monopolization of industry
creates entry restrictions and can cause firms to under invest. A lack of com-
petition is especially detrimental to small organizations, risky projects, and
‘infant’ firms’ willingness to borrow. Moreover, a lack of competition could
result in concentrated sectoral allocation of investment and general inefficient
allocation of investment across sectors and project owners.8 Finally, monop-
6Public and private agents collect information about firms and share this with financial
institutions. Access to more information about firms may allow banks to make a more
accurate and generally a more positive risk assessment when extending credit. Djankov
et al. (2007) find evidence that the private credit to GDP ratio increases along with the
introduction of credit registries, in poorer countries only.
7Competition policy generally comprises the following elements: antitrust and cartels,
market liberalization, state aid control, and merger control. Because competition policy
is formalized in countries’ legal framework, in the context of this study we prefer the label
‘competition institutions’.
8Following La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002, p. 279), “governments are
less able to use the banks they own to redistribute wealth to political supporters when
6
olization of the banking industry can cause frequent breaching of contracts,
lack of risk-diversification, and could undermine credibility in the financial
system.
The benefits from formalizing rules on competition are larger in countries
that have a relatively large private sector. In markets where market access
is limited (e.g. rent creation is an activity of the ruling dominant coalition)
there is an absence of competition. In countries with a small private sector
there is basic absence of competition, but there also is no incentive to develop
rules to stimulate competition.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Institutional Indicators
There are several indicators for property rights, constraints on the executive,
contracting institutions, and creditor rights. Some indicators are not neces-
sarily a good proxy for institutional characteristics. First, ‘constraint on the
executive’ from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) is used
as a proxy for property rights protection by several scholars; e.g. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005); Tressel and Detragiache (2008); Quintyn and Verdier
(2010).9 However, as described by Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shliefer (2004), ‘constraint on the executive’ is a volatile measurement which
is more a reflection of the result of elections.10
Second, in order to measure the effect of contracting institutions, Ace-
moglu and Johnson (2005) use de-jure descriptions of legal arrangements
intended to protect contracts. However, the existence of de-jure rules does
not in itself guarantee that these rules are followed. A general difficulty in
measuring and interpreting institutions lies in quantifying concepts that are
value-loaded and are more easily measured de-jure than de-facto.
they are subject to greater oversight by the electorate”. The authors argue that with
electorate oversight governments have less incentives for bank ownership.
9Tressel and Detragiache (2008, p. 16) argue that only countries with stronger con-
strains on executive experience sustainable financial acceleration after a financial reform,
and that creditor rights, contract enforcement, and legal origins do not determine the
success of sustainable financial accelerations. Similarly, Quintyn and Verdier (2010) find
that countries’ probability to achieve a period of sustained long-run financial development
after a financial acceleration is positively influenced by ‘constraint on executive’ and the
durability of democracy.
10Following calculations on the basis of the sample of 88 countries used throughout this
study, the indicator ‘constraint on the executive’ indeed has more variation over time than
between countries.
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Third, some institutional indicators purport to explain general governance
concepts and can not be used to measure the relative impact of institutional
characteristics. For example, ‘legal origins’ has frequently been interpreted as
a proxy for property rights and contracting institutions, e.g. Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). LaPorta et al.
(2008) summarize that legal origin have influenced the formation of several
institutional aspects: procedural formalism, judicial independence (influenc-
ing property rights protection), regulation of entry, government ownership
of the media, labour laws, conscription, company law and securities law,
bankruptcy law, and government ownership of banks.
Finally, some composite indexes have several underlying variables and
sources. A lack of transparency is a common problem of governance indica-
tors that results in unfit indicators for policy advice which, e.g., is a weakness
of the World Bank World Wide Governance Indicators (Arndt, 2009).
We construct institutional indicators using a relatively unexploited per-
ception based survey, the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD, 2009). The
IPD documents perceptions on both de-jure and de-facto institutional rules.
The data describes ‘stable’ institutional arrangements and do not focus on
describing current change in states’ rule. The advantage of using raw data is
that transparent indicators are constructed. We can trace the weights of the
countries on the constructed indicator and the weights of the underlying vari-
ables on the constructed indicator. Another advantage of using institutional
data from the same source is that there is no difference in data collection and
treatment. The data are fit for cross-country comparison and for comparison
across indicators.11 The major disadvantage of the IPD data is that it lacks
a panel dimension.
The variables that are selected describe institutional arrangements for
property rights, contracting, and competition (see Table 6 in the appendix).12
The core concern with comparing the contribution of the institutional vari-
11Lack of cross-country and over time comparability is a weakness of data from the
World Bank World Wide Governance Indicators, the International Country Risk Rating
(ICRG) / PRS Group, and the Fraser institute (de Crombrugghe, 2010).
12The 4-digit elementary items are not recoded or rescaled. The variables describe
aspects of countries’ institutional setting that influence the cost of operations in the private
sector. This selection does not include variables that describe local and sub-national
institutional arrangements, variables that describe costs for foreign actors, variables that
describe change and reforms, survey questions that are not relevant for all countries, and
survey questions that are unclear, ambiguous, or may be particularly difficult for country
experts to answer. For example, the variable A3070 about the influence of economic
stakeholders in economic regulatory policy has the scale 1 = very frequently to 4 = very
rarely. The surveys respondents may differ in their interpretation of what is frequent. For
this reason this survey question is excluded from the selection.
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ables on a countries’ level of credit is that the variables are closely related.
The correlation between the variables is particularly high because the vari-
ables all describe aspects of countries’ institutional formalization.13
Principal component analysis with varimax orthogonal rotation is used
to create three ‘new’ indicators. Orthogonal rotation avoids multicollinear-
ity of the institutional indicators. The varimax rotation method is chosen
because it produces components that contain high loadings for a few vari-
ables.14 Three components are retained because the variable selection is
made with the objective to describe three conceptual constructs (property
rights, contracting and competition).
Figure 1 shows the component loadings on each variable. Component 1
contains 32% of the total variation. This component loads high on the vari-
ables B7020, B7021, C7010, and C7011 which describe the degree of exis-
tence and effectiveness of competition regulations. Component 1 is therefore
interpreted as the component describing the degree of formalization of com-
petition institutions. Countries that score high on this component are for
example Ireland, Korea, and the Netherlands. Countries that score low on
this component are for example Kuwait, Qatar, and Mali. The lower bound
of the component captures countries that have little or no arrangements to
stimulate competition.
Component 2 contains 25% of the total variation and loads high on the
variables A6001 and A6002. These variables describe the degree of reasonable
compensation granted in the event of expropriation of property. Component
2 is therefore identified as describing institutional rules to secure property
rights. The upper bound of component 2 describes countries that have se-
cured property rights protection across sectors. Countries that score high on
this component are Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Kuwait. Countries that
score low on component 2 are Pakistan, Cameroon, and Syria.
Component 3 contains 21% of the total variation and loads high on vari-
able A3040 which describes the predictability of the results of public procure-
ment contract bids. This component captures the de-facto role of the state in
13The variables have correlations roughly around 0.6. On average, the correlations
between the variables in the IPD are less than 0.5. In particular, variables that fall
under the functions (2) ‘Safety, law and order’, (4) ‘Markets’ operating freedom’, and (8)
‘Openness to the outside world’, have relatively lower correlations with our selection of
variables. IPD variables that are strongly correlated with the selection of variables are
also conceptually closely related. These include survey questions regarding intellectual
property rights, respect for law, independence of the court, transparency in state owned
enterprises, and corruption.
14The principal component analysis is run using the 88 countries listed on page 28 in
the appendix. The principal component analysis is run using the Stata command ‘factor’
with specification pcf.
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contracting. Countries that have transparent contracting regulations score
on the upper bound of this component, for example Finland, Cyprus, and
Philippines. Countries that score low on component 3 are Guatemala, Benin,
and Chad. In the sequel, component 1 is referred to as ‘Competition’, com-
ponent 2 as ‘Property’, and component 3 as ‘Contract’.
Figure 1: Construction of Orthogonal Institutional Measurements
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As illustrated by the scatter plots and the correlation table in the ap-
pendix, higher levels of credit in the private sector are associated with higher
values of Competition, Property, and Contract. European countries score
on the upper bound of the institutional indicators but differ substantially in
the level of credit to the private sector. Some more pronounced differences
between the institutional indicators include Qatar and Kuwait that score low
on Competition but high on Property. Syria, Philippines, and Pakistan score
low on Property but high on Contract. Chad, and the Czech Republic score
low on Contract but high on Property. Argentina, Cameroon, China, and
India score low on Property but high on Competition. Guatemala and Korea
score low on Contract but high on Competition.
3.2 Model and Methodology
The aim of this study is to estimate effects of the between-country difference
of the institutional time-invariant (TI) indicators and both the between-
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county and over-time variation of the time-varying (TV) indicators. In this
section, the basic model is introduced as well as some terminology that is
used throughout the remainder of this study.
Our main methodological challenge is the estimation of the effect of TI
institutional indicators without biases or inconsistencies. The model is es-
timated using a Hausman-Taylor estimator with Amemiya-MaCurdy (1986)
specification, hereafter AM. The AM method builds on the instrumental vari-
able method proposed by Hausman and Taylor (HT) (1981). The HT method
estimates the parameters using the TV variables both to estimate their own
coefficients and as instruments for the endogenous TI variables (Hausman
and Taylor, 1981). The HT method uses the time-average of the TV ex-
ogenous variables as instruments. Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) propose
combining the between-country and over-time information of the TV exoge-
nous variables as instruments. The model is mathematically represented by
equation 1 below.
Yi,t = βXi,t + γZi + αi + i,t (1)
Yi,t is the dependent variable, the level of credit to the private sector in
country i in year t. αi represents the unobservable country-specific effect.
αi is assumed a random variable that is distributed independently across
our country sample with constant variance σ2α. i,t is the error term and
is assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance σ2 , conditional on
Xi,t and Zi. Xi,t is a vector of TV indicators and is assumed to contain
both exogenous and endogenous indicators. Zi is a vector of TI indicators
and also is assumed to contain both exogenous and endogenous indicators.
The endogenous part of Zi contains the institutional indicators. Only the
between-country variation of the institutional characteristics is observed and
the institutional characteristics are assumed inert in the medium-term.
The vector Xi,t includes several macroeconomic indicators. Data sources
are given in Table 9 in the appendix. We control for the effect of savings on
Yi,t because the availability of collateral is a major requirement for creditors.
Countries’ external debt may be negatively related to financial development.
Countries that have a large capital account surplus may rely on foreign fund-
ing for investment instead of stimulating saving and investment in the do-
mestic economy.15 We control for the influence of exchange rates. Finally,
we control for inflation measured as the rate of change in the consumer price
index. High inflation discourages lending. All these variables are assumed to
be exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with αi and i,t.
The following TI indicators are used: incidence of malaria, temperate
15As illustrated in Table 8 in the appendix, the variables savings and external debt are
highly correlated.
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zones, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation.16 These are all
assumed to be exogenous. On the one hand, scholars studying the effect of
endowment, e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff. (1997), propose that countries’ nat-
ural resources and climate influences institutional development. The formal-
ization of property rights is argued to be related to the incidence of malaria
and to temperate zones by deep historical roots. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue
that there were less incentives to ‘settle’ and develop formal property rights
institutions in regions with high incidence of malaria and tropical climates.
Similarly, tropical climates may be related to relative underdevelopment of
contracting institutions. Also, it is more likely that industry developed in
countries with temperate zones favorable to agricultural development. As a
result, in such areas there may be a higher need for competition institutions.
On the other hand, institutional formalization may be related to class frag-
mentation. The formalization of competition regulations may be influenced
by ethnic fragmentation; high ethnic fragmentation may contribute to the
economic/political dominance of a (small) ethnic majority. Countries with
high linguistic fragmentation may have established more formal regulations
to facilitate business. In countries with religious fragmentation, states may
have had more incentive to separate the church from private sector regu-
lations. Thereby, such countries may have early establishments of a more
formal institutional setting.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the data to unobserved unit effects
and reverse causality, the model is also tested using OLS with panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE)17 and fixed effects vector decomposition, hereafter
FEVD.18
16Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use an IV approach with legal origins and settler mor-
tality as instruments for property rights and contracting. These frequently used indicators
are both based on the argument that the legal system and institutional heritage of coun-
tries influence today’s institutions. Scholars have extensively argued that these indicators
suffer from measurement bias, reverse-causality and/or estimations may suffer from omit-
ted variable bias.
17PCSEs, as proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), correct for ‘extreme overconfidence’ and
yield standard errors that are within 10% of the true variability, also for data containing
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneously correlated errors. PCSE does not address unit
effects.
18The FEVD estimates for TV variables are the same as Fixed Effect (FE) estimates
and are assumed endogenous. Yet unlike FE estimations, FEVD estimates TI variables in
panel data models with unit effects. TI variables are assumed exogenous and the method
does not control for causality. FEVD and HT estimators provide equal results when all
TV variables are treated as endogenous and the TI variables are treated as exogenous
(Breusch, Ward, Hoa, and Kompas, 2011). FEVD has received several critiques, e.g. see
Greene (2011); Chatelain and Ralf (2010); Breusch et al. (2011). The FEVD estimations
here are based on an updated 2009 version (xtfevd4.0beta.ado) with revised standard
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A Hausman specification test rejects a random effects model over a fixed
effects model. A Hausman test of the difference between a FE model and
Amemiya-MaCurdy (AM) yields a χ2 value of 0.37, which is insignificant;
this supports estimating using AM.19 The low χ2 statistic indicates that
the coefficients of the FE estimation and the AM estimation are close. A
Hausman test based on the difference between HT and AM yields a χ2 value
of 3.47 which also is insignificant. Thereby, this Hausman test does not reject
the additional exogeneity assumptions of AM.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
This study is based on a balanced panel dataset for the period 1994 to 2005.
The sample of countries used throughout the analyses is listed in Table 5 in
the appendix.20
There is substantial cross-country variation in the level of credit to the
private sector. As illustrated by Figure 2 in the appendix, the average of
countries’ ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP during 1994-2005
ranges from less than 10% to more than 150%.21 In Table 7 in the appendix
are the summary statistics for the sample. The average level of credit to
GDP is 47.35%. Figure 3 in the appendix illustrates the variation of credit
to GDP by geographic region. The data show that both the level of credit to
the private sector and the formalization of institutional rules are high in some
geographic regions and low in other regions. For example, in Sub-Saharan
Africa the level of credit to GDP is low and organizations rely on informal
institutional rules.
errors (Plumer and Troeger, 2011).
19The Hausman tests are based on the estimations presented in Table 1 where Compe-
tition, Property, and Contract are endogenous.
20The countries Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, India,
Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and Zambia are not included in the sample
because of hyperinflation rates and/or high levels of exchange rate over-valuation.
21The dependent variable Credit has missing data for the following countries: Austria,
Belgium, France, Mauritania, Netherlands, and Norway. These countries are excluded
when using the variable Credit. In addition, Japan is excluded because of the country’s
high level of Credit. For some countries, data on the credit claims includes credit to public
enterprises.
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4.2 Main Results
Table 1 reports the relation between credit to the private sector and in-
stitutional characteristics whilst controlling for macroeconomic influences.
Column 1 to 3 report the estimation results using the different regression
methods. There is a strong and significant relationship between credit and
the formalization of institutional characteristics. Unlike the OLS with PCSE
and FEVD methods, the AM method controls for endogeneity of the in-
stitutional indicators in an attempt to establish a causal relationship. The
magnitude of the institutional coefficients is relatively similar. This similarity
suggests limited reverse causality between credit markets and institutional
formalization.
The AM estimations in column 3 report that the formalization of Com-
petition, Property, and Contract institutions has a significant and positive
impact on credit deepening.22 Temperate and Malaria are significant at a
10% level and have a direct impact on credit deepening. Following the re-
sults of the OLS estimation, Religion and Language are also related to credit
deepening. External debt and savings have the expected sign, are signif-
icant, and the estimations are relatively constant across regressions. The
coefficients for Inflation and ExchangeRate are close to zero.
Column 4 in Table 1 reports the aggregate / combined magnitude of the
formalization of institutional characteristics on the private sector, measured
by ‘Composite’.23 Composite is measured by the first retained component
from an unrotated principal component analysis on the total selection of IPD
variables. Unrotated principal component analysis yields only one strong
institutional dimension. Composite contains 66% of the total variation and
loads on all underlying variables.24 The coefficient of Composite indicates
the overall degree to which the institutional characteristics are related to
financial depth.25 The coefficient of Composite is higher than the coefficient
of Competition, Property and Contract. The AM model in column 4 predicts
that, ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the formalization
of rules corresponds to a 0.71 standard deviation increase in credit to the
private sector as a percentage of GDP.
22The first component (Competition) contains the highest of the total variation and
therefore we expect that this component is more closely related to the overall dimension
of institutional formalization than Property and Contract. For this reason, the relative
contribution of each institutional characteristics is not emphasized.
23See also Figure 5 in the appendix.
24The second component contains 7% of the variation and the third component contains
5% of the variation.
25The results of the Hausman tests in section 3.2 are confirmed when Competition,
Property, and Contract are replaced by Composite.
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One concern with data on credit to the private sector is that high levels
of credit may be an indication of excess borrowing. Excess borrowing results
in high systemic risks and, in the long-run, may have a negative impact on
growth. For the years 1994-2005, the average level of credit to GDP exceeds
100% for the following countries: New Zealand, Portugal, China, Germany,
Thailand, South Africa, United Kingdom, Canada, Malaysia, Switzerland,
United States, and Cyprus. The above mentioned countries are excluded
in the analysis presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 1. The 100% thresh-
hold does not imply that countries above the threshold experienced a credit
bubble. In fact, there are no cross-country thresholds that can be used to
identify what level of credit to GDP is associated with credit repression, what
level is associated with abundance, and what level of debt is appropriate at
a given stage of economic development. However, by comparing the results
in column 3, 4, 5, and 6, we can identify the extent to which the estimations
are influenced by countries with high levels of credit to the private sector.
The coefficient for Competition is lower in column 5 compared to column
3 suggesting that competition institutions is more important for countries
with high levels of credit. The coefficient for Property is higher in column
5 compared to column 3 suggesting that property rights protection is more
important for countries with low or moderate levels of credit. The magnitude
of the composite indicator is higher in column 3 than in column 5. This
suggests that the private sector is less influenced by the formalization of
institutional rules in countries with lower levels of credit.
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Table 1: Regression Results: Dependent Variable Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FEVD OLS with PCSE AM AM AM AM
Competition 0.522*** 0.525*** 0.505** 0.391**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Property 0.376*** 0.362*** 0.398* 0.437***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Contract 0.393*** 0.355*** 0.388** 0.372**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Composite 0.710*** 0.627***
(0.00) (0.00)
Language 0.062 0.032** 0.060 0.060 -0.065 -0.053
(0.60) (0.00) (0.75) (0.67) (0.66) (0.68)
Ethnic -0.028 -0.005 -0.035 -0.046 -0.114 -0.097
(0.81) (0.78) (0.85) (0.74) (0.45) (0.45)
Malaria -0.340** -0.306*** -0.334+ -0.329* -0.172 -0.188
(0.01) (0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.30) (0.20)
Temperate -0.374** -0.354*** -0.372+ -0.366* -0.254 -0.274+
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13) (0.06)
Religion 0.152+ 0.148*** 0.153 0.155 0.004 0.003
(0.07) (0.00) (0.26) (0.14) (0.97) (0.98)
ExDebt -0.107*** -0.124** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.178*** -0.175***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.133*** 0.121** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.205*** 0.198***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.023+ -0.157*** -0.024+ -0.025* -0.043* -0.046*
(0.08) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
ExRate -0.015 -0.082*** -0.018 -0.020 -0.028 -0.031
(0.62) (0.00) (0.54) (0.49) (0.49) (0.43)
N 972 972 972 972 828 828
R2 0.912 0.548
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
 exogenous = (ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic, Temperate, Religion)
 endogenous = (Competition, Property, Contract, Composite)
4.3 Institutions - Policy Mix
Financial policy is an important tool for states by which they can influence
the allocation of credit. Financial policy may have a positive or a negative
impact on credit deepening. We control for the effect of financial policy on
credit to the private sector using three indicators from Abiad, Detragiache,
and Tressel (2010). We use a smaller sample of 61 countries.26
26The following countries are excluded because of missing policy data: Benin, Botswana,
Central African Republic, Cyprus, Gabon, Honduras, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mongolia,
Mauritania, Niger, Panama, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Syr-
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We control for the influence of the degree of privatization of banks (de-
crease in State ownership), for the effect of the degree of bank supervision
(decrease in independence from executive influence), and for the effect of
entry barriers in the banking sector (decrease in state control over credit
allocation). These TV policy indicators are assumed to be endogenous.
The privatization of banks could result in more lending to the private sec-
tor. La Porta et al. (2002) find that in countries with high government own-
ership of banks, financial development, productivity and growth is lower.27
Privatization could result in more efficient and effective allocation of credit.
Furthermore, privatization could result in higher competition, increasing bor-
rowing opportunities for organizations. Yet, in comparison to government-
owned banks, the cost of borrowing is generally higher in privatized banks.28
Banking supervision may increase transparency. The implementation of
prudential regulations can restrain the allocation of credit into unproductive,
high risk projects. In the 1980’s, the objective of most high-income coun-
tries was financial market deregulation. Since 2008, deregulation is heavily
debated by stakeholders with the aim to re-gain control over financial safety.
The indicator ‘Barriers’ captures the degree of entry restrictions of banks’
activities. Such entry barriers may also restrict the lending capacity of the
financial sector. Entry barriers may drive up the cost of borrowing which in
return can cause a lower demand for credit.
There is a positive relation between countries’ degree of supervision in
the banking sector and the level of credit in the private sector. The correla-
tion between credit and banking supervision is, in comparison, substantially
higher than the correlation between credit on the one hand and privatization
and entry barriers on the other hand (see Table 8 in the appendix).
ian Arab Republic, Chad, and Togo. In addition, the following countries are excluded:
Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Norway, and Japan. See also footnote 21.
27Following the political view, La Porta et al. (2002) explain that “government ownership
leads to miss-allocation of resources” and that “governments are less able to use banks
they own to redistribute wealth to political supporters when they are subject to greater
oversight by the electorate. As a consequence they have less interest in owning such banks”
(La Porta et al., 2002, p. 188,179).
28Government-owned banks may select less risky projects to finance. On the basis of a
model of banking Andrianova, Demetriades, and Shortland (2008, p. 230) find that “where
private and government-owned banks co-exist, the former will offer a higher interest rate
to depositors reflecting the higher risk”.
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Table 2: AM Regression Results: Dependent variable Credit
(1) (2)
Competition 0.389*
(0.02)
Property 0.438**
(0.00)
Contract 0.404**
(0.00)
Composite 0.729***
(0.00)
Privatization -0.019 -0.019
(0.50) (0.49)
Supervision 0.072** 0.074**
(0.00) (0.00)
Barriers 0.089** 0.087**
(0.00) (0.00)
Language 0.019 0.014
(0.91) (0.93)
Ethnic -0.027 -0.008
(0.89) (0.96)
Malaria -0.424* -0.403*
(0.03) (0.02)
Temperate -0.619** -0.611**
(0.01) (0.00)
Religion 0.223+ 0.214+
(0.09) (0.06)
ExternalDebt -0.149*** -0.150***
(0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.243*** 0.244***
(0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.015 -0.016
(0.34) (0.31)
ExchangeRate -0.042 -0.045
(0.21) (0.18)
N 732 732
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = (ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic, Temperate, Religion)
Endogenous = (Competition, Property, Contract, Composite, Privatization, Supervision, Barriers)
Table 2 reports the regression results when the policy indicators are in-
cluded. Column 1 and 2 report that the effect of banking supervision and
entry barriers on the level of credit is significant, and the coefficient is pos-
itive, albeit low. The coefficient for banking privatization is not significant.
Temperate is significant at a 1% level, and Malaria is significant at a 5%
level. The coefficients for Temperate and Malaria are substantially higher in
Table 2 than in Table 1. Religion is significant at a 10% level. On the one
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hand, when controlling for policy, the coefficients of Contract, Property and
Composite are higher. On the other hand, the coefficient for Competition is
lower.29
4.4 Alternative Dependent Variables
In this section, we present the estimation results using alternative dependent
variables.30 First, we test the impact of institutional characteristics on the
level of domestic bank credit to the private sector.31 Unlike the dependent
variable Credit, this indicator does not include the volume of credit issued
by development banks. The correlation between these indicators is 0.97.
Second, we test our model using the level of bank deposits to GDP.32 The
correlation between Credit and Bank deposits is 0.85. Third, the model is
also estimated using investment as a share of GDP as the dependent variable.
The correlation between Credit and Investment is 0.49.
The estimations results are reported in Table 3. When using bank credit
as the dependent variable the AM method yields coefficients for the insti-
tutional indicators that are relatively similar to those presented in Table 2.
In column 3 and 4, Property, Contract, and Composite are significantly re-
lated to the level of Bank Deposits, although their estimated impact is lower.
The coefficient for Competition is not significant. This suggests that banks’
lending capacity is dependent on the formalization of property rights and
contracting but is unrelated to competition institutions.
The regression results in column 5, with investment as the dependent
variable, indicate that Competition has a positive and significant impact on
the level of investment to GDP. Composite is likewise related to Investment,
presumably because of the underlying competition indicator. The coeffi-
cients for Property and Contract are not significant. These results suggest
that competition drives investment. Countries that have substantially higher
levels of investment have implemented formal competition institutions. Some
oil rich countries have strong property rights protection but have relatively
low competition and relatively lower levels of investment as a percentage of
GDP. This could imply that the translation of credit deepening into higher
levels of investment requires the implementation of competition regulations.
29The policy measurements have a strong correlation with the institutional indicators.
30As in section 4.3, countries with missing policy data are excluded. See also footnote
26. Data sources are given in the appendix, Table 9.
31This regression analysis does not include data for Austria, Belgium, Botswana, France,
Japan, Netherlands, and Norway.
32The countries Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, China, France, Japan, Libya, Nether-
lands, and Qatar are excluded from this regression analysis.
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When using investment as the dependent variable, the coefficients of Tem-
perate are close to zero whilst the coefficients for ExternalDebt and Savings
are high.
Table 3: AM Regression Results: Alternative Dependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BankCredit BankCredit BankDeposit BankDeposit Investment Investment
Competition 0.364* 0.348 0.336*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.04)
Property 0.426** 0.526** 0.192
(0.00) (0.01) (0.21)
Contract 0.395** 0.385* 0.044
(0.01) (0.04) (0.75)
Composite 0.704*** 0.763*** 0.323*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Privatization -0.086** -0.086** -0.042+ -0.044+ 0.091*** 0.089***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Supervision 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.040*** 0.039***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Barriers 0.078** 0.077** 0.070** 0.068** 0.036* 0.036*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Language 0.075 0.070 0.196 0.164 0.048 0.042
(0.68) (0.67) (0.39) (0.33) (0.79) (0.73)
Ethnic -0.063 -0.042 -0.084 -0.018 -0.149 -0.174
(0.74) (0.80) (0.75) (0.92) (0.42) (0.16)
Malaria -0.485* -0.463* -0.461+ -0.452* -0.214 -0.287*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.29) (0.04)
Temperate -0.615** -0.607** -0.681* -0.671** -0.026 -0.050
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.91) (0.76)
Religion 0.204 0.194 -0.020 -0.032 -0.116 -0.087
(0.13) (0.12) (0.91) (0.81) (0.37) (0.33)
ExternalDebt -0.070* -0.070* 0.046 0.042 -0.710*** -0.709***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.125** 0.125** -0.012 -0.009 0.656*** 0.665***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.81) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.003 -0.003 -0.016 -0.018 -0.000 -0.000
(0.86) (0.83) (0.24) (0.20) (0.96) (0.95)
ExchangeRate -0.042 -0.044 -0.030 -0.032 -0.102*** -0.100***
(0.18) (0.16) (0.32) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00)
N 732 732 720 720 804 804
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = (ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic, Temperate, Religion)
Endogenous = (Competition, Property, Contract, Composite, Privatization, Supervision, Barriers)
In contrast to the estimation results with Credit as the dependent vari-
ables, the estimations in Table 3 report a significant impact of all policy
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indicators. The models in column 1 to 4 suggest that privatization of the
banking sector has had a negative effect on the level of bank deposits and
bank credit to the private sector. From column 5 and 6 we conclude that
privatization is important for stimulating investment, albeit its effect is small.
Overall, both the formalization of institutional characteristics and finan-
cial policy are important for countries’ financial market. Nevertheless, the
differences across the models support the thesis that the formalization of
institutional rules is a stage by stage process.
4.5 Robustness
The dynamics are further explored by lagging the TV macroeconomic and
policy variables by one year. The importance of substituting a current value
with a one year lag may be relevant for the estimation of some countries.
The regulatory processes to obtain credit may be relatively slower in coun-
tries that have relatively low levels of credit. The estimation results with
the lagged variables are reported in Table 4 column 1, 2, 3, and 4. The
estimations for the institutional indicators are positive and significant, Yet,
several coefficients of institutional indicators are lower than the coefficients
of institutional indicators presented in Table 1 and Table 2. In addition, we
smooth the TV data into five year average levels and growth rates. Current
values are substituted for the average of the observations in the current year
and for those in the previous four years. The results are presented in Table 4
column 5, 6, 7, and 8. The institutional variables remain positive and signif-
icant. However, the policy indicators are not significant. This supports the
thesis that financial policy only has an impact on short term macroeconomic
changes.
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Table 4: Robustness Tests. AM Regression Results: Dependent Variable
Credit
Models with lags Models with smoothed averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Competition 0.486** 0.400* 0.542** 0.350+
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.06)
Property 0.380* 0.461** 0.358* 0.566***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Contract 0.373* 0.385** 0.502*** 0.450**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Composite 0.681*** 0.742*** 0.771*** 0.822***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Privatization -0.005 -0.005 0.021 0.021
(0.86) (0.85) (0.66) (0.64)
Supervision 0.060* 0.061** 0.044 0.045
(0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.20)
Barriers 0.077** 0.075* 0.074 0.069
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.15)
Language 0.063 0.063 0.018 0.007 0.019 0.031 -0.021 -0.043
(0.73) (0.65) (0.92) (0.97) (0.90) (0.84) (0.91) (0.81)
Ethnic -0.040 -0.051 -0.028 -0.002 0.023 -0.014 -0.030 0.034
(0.83) (0.71) (0.88) (0.99) (0.89) (0.93) (0.88) (0.85)
Malaria -0.332+ -0.327* -0.399+ -0.392* -0.303+ -0.284+ -0.335+ -0.320
(0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Temperate -0.345+ -0.339* -0.598** -0.596** -0.345+ -0.344+ -0.593** -0.574*
(0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Religion 0.156 0.158 0.212 0.206+ 0.141 0.140 0.200 0.183
(0.24) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.16)
ExternalDebt -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.264*** -0.260*** -0.354*** -0.361***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Savings 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.293*** 0.288*** 0.486*** 0.473***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation -0.032* -0.034** -0.026 -0.027 -0.041* -0.041* -0.032 -0.035
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.16)
ExchangeRate -0.012 -0.014 -0.033 -0.035 -0.014 -0.018 -0.042 -0.044
(0.69) (0.63) (0.33) (0.30) (0.72) (0.65) (0.37) (0.35)
N 891 891 671 671 648 648 488 488
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous = (ExternalDebt, Savings, Inflation, ExchangeRate, Language, Malaria, Ethnic, Temperate, Religion)
Endogenous = (Competition, Property, Contract, Composite)
5 Conclusion
The results of this study only partially confirm those of Acemoglu and John-
son (2005). Following these authors’ conclusive argument, property rights
institutions are related to countries’ level of credit to the private sector.
However, the authors find that contracting institutions do not matter for
credit deepening. We find evidence that credit deepening increases along
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with countries’ formalization of property rights protection, contracting, and
competition institutions. Only property rights and contracting institutions
are related to banks’ lending capacity, and only competition institutions have
a positive impact on investment. The overall dimension of institutional for-
malization is positively related to financial development and higher levels of
investment to GDP.
The financial sector is an important mediating factor in the institutions -
growth relationship. Before the crisis formalized institutional rules were gen-
erally described as beneficial because of their association with high volumes
of credit. Since the crisis more focus is on understanding to what extent
credit deepening is beneficial for economic growth. We emphasize that a
lack of credit to the private sector is expected to form an obstacle to growth
and development.
This study documents why institutional characteristics are difficult to
measure. On the one hand, composite institutions / governance indicators
as well as broad institutional surveys can not be used to assess a country’s
performance on specific institutional aspects. On the other hand, specific
institutional aspects are closely related amongst each other and are closely
related to composite indicators. Therefore, we estimate the impact of closely
related institutional characteristics by constructing orthogonal institutional
indicators. Policymakers need to be careful when assessing a country’s in-
stitutional development. Because of the interrelatedness of the institutional
characteristics, the degree of formalization of institutional characteristics may
be best documented on the basis of a more general institutional dimension.
This study would benefit from further analysis on the impact of institu-
tional characteristics on credit markets, investment, and growth. Questions
that arise include: Under what institutional conditions does credit deepening
have a positive effect on growth? Does formalization of intellectual property
rights protection lead to a higher degree of investment in intangible assets?
What is the effect of institutional formalization on informal lending?
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6 Appendix
Table 5: Country List
Code Country Region Classification
ARG Argentina Latin America
AUS Australia Western Europe and North America
AUT Austria Western Europe and North America
BEL Belgium Western Europe and North America
BEN Benin Sub-Saharan Africa
BFA Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa
BGD Bangladesh South Asia
BOL Bolivia Latin America
BWA Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa
CAF Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa
CAN Canada Western Europe and North America
CHE Switzerland Western Europe and North America
CHN China East Asia
CIV Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa
CMR Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa
COL Colombia Latin America
CYP Cyprus Western Europe and North America
CZE Czech Republic Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
DEU Germany Western Europe and North America
DNK Denmark Western Europe and North America
DOM Dominican Republic Latin America
DZA Algeria North Africa and the Middle East
ECU Ecuador Latin America
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. North Africa and the Middle East
ESP Spain Western Europe and North America
EST Estonia Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
FIN Finland Western Europe and North America
FRA France Western Europe and North America
GAB Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa
GBR United Kingdom Western Europe and North America
GHA Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa
GRC Greece Western Europe and North America
GTM Guatemala Latin America
HND Honduras Latin America
HUN Hungary Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
IND India South Asia
IRL Ireland Western Europe and North America
ISR Israel North Africa and the Middle East
ITA Italy Western Europe and North America
JOR Jordan North Africa and the Middle East
JPN Japan East Asia
KEN Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa
KOR Korea, Rep. East Asia
Continued on next page
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KWT Kuwait North Africa and the Middle East
LBY Libya North Africa and the Middle East
LKA Sri Lanka South Asia
LTU Lithuania Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
LVA Latvia Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
MAR Morocco North Africa and the Middle East
MDG Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa
MEX Mexico Latin America
MLI Mali Sub-Saharan Africa
MNG Mongolia Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
MOZ Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa
MRT Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa
MYS Malaysia South-East Asia
NER Niger Sub-Saharan Africa
NLD Netherlands Western Europe and North America
NOR Norway Western Europe and North America
NPL Nepal South Asia
NZL New Zealand Western Europe and North America
PAK Pakistan South Asia
PAN Panama Latin America
PER Peru Latin America
PHL Philippines South-East Asia
POL Poland Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
PRT Portugal Western Europe and North America
QAT Qatar North Africa and the Middle East
ROM Romania Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
RUS Russian Federation Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
SAU Saudi Arabia North Africa and the Middle East
SDN Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa
SEN Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
SVK Slovak Republic Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
SVN Slovenia Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union
SWE Sweden Western Europe and North America
SYR Syrian Arab Republic North Africa and the Middle East
TCD Chad Sub-Saharan Africa
TGO Togo Sub-Saharan Africa
THA Thailand South-East Asia
TUN Tunisia North Africa and the Middle East
TUR Turkey North Africa and the Middle East
TZA Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa
UGA Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa
URY Uruguay Latin America
USA United States Western Europe and North America
VEN Venezuela, RB Latin America
ZAF South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
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Table 6: Selection of Institutional Variables -IPD 2009-
Competition: Degree of formalization of pro-competition institutional ar-
rangements.
Degree of administrative barriers (e.g. red tape) restricting firm entry (B7000)
Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat re-
strictive collective agreements i.e. cartels (B7020)
Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to combat abuses
of dominant positions (B7021)
Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat restrictive
collective agreements i.e. cartels (C7010)
Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat abuse of
dominant position (C7011)
Property: Degree of formalization of property rights protection across
sectors.
Effectiveness of legal measures to defend property rights between private agents
(A6000)
Degree of reasonable compensation in the event of de-jure or de-facto expropriation
of land property (A6001)
Degree of reasonable compensation in the event of de-jure or de-facto expropriation
of property for production (A6002)
Frequency of arbitrary government pressure on private property (e.g. using red tape)
(A6003)
Respect for intellectual property protection in terms of manufacturing secrets, patents
(B6020)
Respect for intellectual property protection in terms of counterfeiting (B6021)
Contract: Degree of formalization of institutional arrangements facilita-
tion contracting.
Predictability of the results of public procurement contract bids (A3040)
Independence of the commercial courts from the government in commercial disputes
(A6020)
Extent of enforcement and speed of commercial court rulings
Extent of enforcement of bankruptcy law (A6030)
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Figure 3: Credit in the Private Sector
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Source: WDI 2011
Regional variation in credit to the private sector / GDP: 1994−2005
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max Number
of obser-
vations
Credit 47.35 45.10 0 231.7 972
Credit* 52.77 45.29 0 195.52 732
BankCredit* 65.10 48.32 1.89 225.17 732
BankDeposit* 43.76 28.84 6.66 151.28 720
Investment* 20.85 9.30 1.16 48.612 804
Composite 0.47 0.31 0 1 1056
ExternalDebt -1.66 10.73 -100.97 44.95 1056
Savings 20.21 11.52 -40.81 69.61 1056
Inflation 9 18.63 -9.8 307.63 1056
ExchangeRate 182.71 382.12 0.03 2877.65 1056
Privatization 1.77 1.12 0 3 804
Supervision 1.64 0.92 0 3 804
Barriers 2.65 0.72 0 3 804
*Summary statistics for sample with policy indicators
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Figure 4: Scatter Plots: Credit and Institutional indicators
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Relation between credit in the private sector and Property
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Figure 5: Scatter Plots: Credit and Composite
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Table 9: Sources
Variable Definition Source Scale
Credit Domestic credit to
private sector
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% of GDP
BankCredit Domestic credit
provided by bank-
ing sector
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% of GDP
BankDeposit Deposits of de-
posit monetary
institutions
Beck and Demirg-
Kunt (2009), IMF
% of GDP
Investment Investment, Cur-
rent Price National
Accounts at PPPs
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2009)
% of GDP
Property,
Contract,
Competi-
tion, Com-
posite
Institutional indi-
cators
IPD (2009) Indicators are
normalized on a
scale of 0 = low
formalization of
rules to 1 = high
formalization of
rules. Original
data ranges from
0-4 and 1-4
Supervision Prudential regula-
tions and supervi-
sion of the banking
sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = unregu-
lated, to 3 = regu-
lated
Privatization State ownership in
the banking sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = repressed,
to 3 = liberalized
Continued on next page
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Barriers Entry barriers in
the banking sector
Abiad et al. (2010) From 0 = repressed
to 3 = liberalized
Inflation Rate of change in
the consumer price
index
World Bank (2011),
IMF
% change
Savings Gross domestic sav-
ings
World Bank (2011) % of GDP
ExternalDebt External balance
on goods and
services
World Bank (2011) % of GDP
ExchangeRate Exchange rate Heston et al. (2009) US = 1
Malaria Population at risk
of malaria trans-
mission in 1994
World Health Or-
ganization 1997
/ Glaeser et al.
(2004)
Probability of 0 =
no malaria risk to 1
= high malaria risk
Temperate Population in
Koeppen-Geiger
Climatic zone in
1995
J. L. Gallup and A.
D. Mellinger and J.
D. Sachs (2001)
% of population
Religion Religious fraction-
alization
Alesina, De-
vleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat,
and Wacziarg
(2003)
Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized soci-
ety
Ethnic Ethnic fractional-
ization
Alesina et al. (2003) Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized soci-
ety
Language Linguistic fraction-
alization
Alesina et al. (2003) Probability of 0 =
homogenous to 1 =
fractionalized soci-
ety
Region The geographic re-
gion of the country
Data adapted from
Hadenius and Teo-
rell (2005)
Dummy variable
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